On May 26, 2026, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced at a press conference in Washington the launch of three uncrewed missions under the collective "Moon Base" brand—Moon Base 1, 2, and 3. These missions are scheduled to lift off by the end of 2026 to lay the foundation for a permanent lunar base at the Moon's south pole.
The first mission (Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 1 Endurance) is slated for autumn, followed by the second (Astrobotic Griffin) and third (Intuitive Machines IM-3) at the end of the year. This is more than a technical test; NASA has rebranded and restructured a portion of its Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) contracts to emphasize a strategic shift from the orbital "Lunar Gateway" to surface infrastructure.
By 2029, the total cargo volume will reach approximately four tons, including communication, power, and navigation systems, as well as the first rovers (Astrolab FLIP and Lunar Outpost Pegasus) and scientific instruments from partners such as the ESA and South Korea.
The background to this development is significant. The Artemis program was revitalized in 2017 as a direct response to Chinese progress. Following the successful Artemis II mission (a crewed lunar flyby in April 2026), NASA shifted its focus to the surface, abandoning plans for the Gateway orbital station. The agency plans to build semi-permanent modules between 2029 and 2032, with a sustained human presence expected from 2032 onward. The initial phase alone has a budget of approximately $20 billion. Commercial partners—including Jeff Bezos's Blue Origin, Astrobotic, Intuitive Machines, and SpaceX—are receiving contracts worth hundreds of millions. This is the quintessential American approach: the government sets the goal, while the private sector minimizes risk and accelerates the timeline.
However, beneath the technological exterior lies hard-nosed geopolitics. Since 2021, China has been partnering with Russia to promote the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Beijing remains firm in its intent to land taikonauts by 2030 and begin constructing its base between 2031 and 2035. Both powers are targeting the south pole—a region featuring water ice deposits, constant sunlight, and a distinct strategic advantage. While the U.S. champions the Artemis Accords (with over 40 signatory nations), China is advancing its own framework. This is not simply a race to be first, but a competition for de facto control over resources and the establishment of norms in space law. Neither side is explicitly violating the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but both are creating facts on the ground.
The momentum is undeniable: the explosion of the private space sector (SpaceX, Blue Origin) and global technological advancements have made the Moon a reality rather than a fantasy. For decades, engineers have been refining their knowledge of landing systems, robotics, and resource recycling. The rivalry between the two superpowers acts as a natural collective engine, much like in the 1960s. Yet, a manipulative dimension is also clearly present.
NASA and the White House (under the Trump administration) have consciously utilized the rhetoric of a "golden age" and "staying ahead of China" to lock in Congressional funding. Rebranding standard CLPS missions as "Moon Base" is a textbook PR move: it creates an image of inevitable success, even though actual timelines have been delayed multiple times.
Private companies (with Bezos and Musk publicly supporting the plans) gain media visibility and new investment. China, meanwhile, emphasizes "peaceful international cooperation" while effectively barring most Western partners from its program. Both sides are constructing narratives in which they are the "leaders of humanity" and their opponent is a "threat."
The long-term consequences reach far beyond the Moon itself. Success will allow for the extraction of ice for fuel, enable unique astronomical observations, and serve as a testing ground for Mars technology. Failure or protracted delays would hand the initiative to Beijing and damage the credibility of the American public-private partnership model.
For now, the collective forces of innovation are outweighing manipulation: the private sector has already proven its ability to fly more cheaply and frequently than state monopolies. The risk lies elsewhere—if geopolitical rhetoric takes precedence, we may end up with two competing spheres of influence on the Moon rather than a unified presence.
Ultimately, the lunar race of the 2020s is not merely a rerun of the 1960s, but an evolution to a higher level. It illustrates how the collective human impulse toward the stars can be simultaneously spontaneous and carefully managed.
The priority must be to ensure that manipulation does not overshadow genuine progress. If the U.S. and China (and their respective partners) can find common ground—perhaps through shared scientific experiments or safety standards—the Moon will serve as a common staging ground rather than a battlefield.
For the time being, we are observing a classic equilibrium: the drive for preeminence is pushing the entire industry forward. In this case, it is fortunate that the focus is on space exploration rather than military hardware.
