Goldman Sachs's oil forecasts for 2026 demonstrate not so much the uncertainty of the methodology as the bank's effort to encompass a wide range of possible outcomes amid unprecedented geopolitical volatility.
In just four months, Goldman has revised its forecast for the fourth quarter three times: from $80 at the beginning of the year to $90 in June, linking each revision to the conflict's dynamics and the recovery of exports from the Persian Gulf.
The scale of the current crisis is incomparable to historical precedents. In 2019, an attack on Saudi pipelines removed 5.7 million barrels per day from the market—leading to a Brent surge of $8–10 per barrel on the first trading day. In 2026, the closure of the Persian Gulf removed approximately 20% of global supply—a blow three to five times larger than any conflict since the 1970s.
The International Energy Agency has qualified this as the largest supply disruption in the history of oil markets. Faced with such amplitude, Goldman Sachs cannot simply issue a single forecast; the bank is forced to offer a portfolio of scenarios to reflect both the risk of full-scale escalation (which could push prices above $110) and the probability of a gradual recovery of flows.
Structurally, the oil market in 2026 is defined by the dependence of global supply on several bottlenecks in the Gulf region and OPEC+'s ability to control volumes. Historically, similar situations after 2019 have shown that even short-term disruptions of critical infrastructure lead to a sustained increase in prices through a higher geopolitical risk premium, whereas a supply surplus is quickly absorbed by quotas. Today's institutional constraints—sanctions, logistics, and the internal budgets of producing countries—make a rapid increase in production unlikely without political de-escalation.
Currently, the market situation is shaped by multi-level confrontation: on one hand, discussions about export recovery and sanctions waivers for Iran (the US issued a 60-day permit for Iranian oil trade in June 2026); on the other, a persistent slowdown in demand in Asia and Europe due to high retail fuel prices and logistical uncertainty. Geopolitical risk, meanwhile, carries greater weight: it can instantly remove millions of barrels from the market or return them within weeks, whereas demand reacts with a lag of quarters and cannot quickly readjust to such price swings.
The latent layer of the situation is the banks' own interests in the numbers. Goldman Sachs and similar institutions provide clients with a portfolio of scenarios not so much out of ambition as out of practical necessity: they are needed for managing client risks and justifying trading positions.
The internal consensus among Goldman analysts roughly aligns with the public base case—a range of $80–90 by year-end. However, the extreme points of the range ($60 for an extremely rapid recovery, $115–120 if negotiations collapse) are intentionally widened to maintain reputation amidst the highest volatility and justify hedging positions.
The most likely outcome by the end of 2026 is Brent in the $80–90 per barrel range. This level arises from a moderate recovery of exports from the Gulf (approximately 50–60% of pre-project volumes), the maintenance of current OPEC+ quotas, and the absence of sharp escalation, but also without full normalization of Strait of Hormuz logistics.
Mechanism: geopolitical risks will remain embedded in prices through an uncertainty premium, but catastrophic expansion will not occur; economic demand will remain suppressed due to high fuel prices and slowing growth in Asia and Europe—factors capable of keeping prices in the lower half of the range.
The two strongest counterarguments are a sudden escalation of the conflict (capable of raising prices to $115–120 if destruction affects major export hubs) and a sharp increase in non-OPEC+ production plus active recovery of Iranian exports (capable of lowering prices to $65–70). Both scenarios require events beyond the current base case, but both are already priced in through option premiums.
The key indicator that will show the correctness of the forecast within the next 4–8 weeks will be the dynamics of actual export volumes from the Persian Gulf (not OPEC+ quotas, which have become insignificant given physical constraints) and the volume of restored flows through alternative routes (sea lanes and pipelines bypassing the Strait). If volumes begin to grow steadily without new disruptions amid improving shipping insurance conditions, and prices stabilize in the $80–85 corridor on the back of weakening risk premiums—this will confirm the base scenario of demand recovery with controlled supply.
Final advice: track the physical export volumes from key ports and the dynamics of tanker flows through Oman, rather than just official statements from banks and OPEC+. This will provide a more accurate signal on whether the global oil balance is truly recovering or if we are stuck in a state of uncertainty with a heightened geopolitical risk premium.
