On the night of April 7-8, as the deadline for U.S. President Donald Trump's ultimatum approached, a Pakistani field marshal did what seemed impossible. Asim Munir, Pakistan's Chief of Defence Staff, spent the entire night on the phone, persuading both sides – Washington and Tehran – to step back from the brink. Hours of negotiations, personal diplomatic skill, and Islamabad's strategic influence led to the first truce between the U.S. and Iran in weeks of tense confrontation.
The result was impressive: on April 8, both sides announced a two-week ceasefire. Washington and Tehran thanked Munir and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif almost immediately. A few days later, high-ranking American representatives – Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and other close presidential advisors – arrived in Islamabad for direct talks with the Iranian leadership. These were the highest-level direct contacts between the countries since the severance of diplomatic relations in 1979.
At first glance, Pakistan's role seems paradoxical. By all traditional measures of geopolitical influence – possessing great power status, economic weight, a liberal governance model – Pakistan doesn't fit. Nevertheless, it was Pakistan that achieved what neither China with its diplomatic experience, nor France, Germany, nor even India or Britain, could. Pakistan proved to be the ideal mediator where traditional global players were constrained by their own alliances and contradictions.
This success reflects a deeper and more troubling shift in global politics. In an era of multipolar competition, as old institutions lose their influence, unconventional states – Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey, and others – are beginning to fill a growing vacuum. They act where the UN and traditional international structures cannot or will not. They build trust between adversaries, open secret channels, and create space for compromise.
The examples are numerous and telling. Qatar, as the host of Hamas's political bureau and simultaneously a key American partner in the Middle East (hosting the largest U.S. military base on its territory), played a crucial role in negotiations for a ceasefire and hostage exchange between Hamas and Israel.
Egypt, by controlling the Rafah crossing, used this position to influence the conflict in Gaza. Turkey, with its connections in Washington, Moscow, and among Palestinian movements, became an indispensable mediator in negotiations concerning grain and security. Saudi Arabia and Oman helped halt Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, advancing regional stability interests.
Pakistan possesses a unique combination of advantages: strategic ties with China and Saudi Arabia, historical and religious connections with Iran, and – following the May 2025 conflict with India, which ended with Trump's mediation – restored relations with the U.S. This geometry allowed it to step in where others could not or would not dare.
It became evident to Washington that in the new world order, it cannot rely solely on traditional allies. The U.S. was forced to recognize that states that do not fit into the usual categories of friend or foe can be more useful than bloc alliances. A portfolio of relationships with such mediators is becoming not a diplomatic luxury, but a necessity for survival.
This presents American policy with a new challenge: how to maintain flexibility in cooperation with states that do not share Western values but resolve real crises? The answer, it seems, is that Washington has no choice. In the coming years, costly military adventures may prove to be a luxury the U.S. simply cannot afford. The ability to find compromises through intermediaries is not an alternative to force, but a complement to it, designed for an era of instability where conflicts spiral one after another, and peace requires new architects.
