The ongoing negotiations regarding northeastern Syria remain stagnant, despite discussions between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the administration in Damascus. Currently, there has been no breakthrough in the differing positions and terms reflecting the conflicting visions of both parties regarding Syria's future.
Militarily, clashes continue between the Freedom Operations Room, which includes factions of the Syrian National Army, and the SDF near the Tishrin Dam area in eastern Aleppo. The Freedom Operations Room, which aims to advance toward Raqqa countryside, is receiving limited Turkish air support.
Sources close to the new administration in Damascus indicate that an offer was made to the SDF to resolve the northeastern Syria issue. This proposal includes acknowledging Kurdish cultural rights and integrating them into the upcoming constitution, as well as allowing Kurds to participate in the security and military institutions. The administration emphasized that it would not be centralized and would allow local councils to manage provincial affairs.
However, the SDF has not accepted the offer, insisting on maintaining its military presence and territorial control. They proposed to the administration that they would share a portion of oil fields and wells instead. The SDF justifies its demands by citing concerns over a potential Turkish invasion, as well as the lack of integration of the National Army factions into the Ministry of Defense.
In response, the Damascus administration rejected the idea of maintaining military factions outside state control and is unwilling to treat oil fields as a political negotiation issue. Recent reports from SDF-affiliated media suggest that meetings will resume between SDF leader Mazloum Abdi and Syrian administration leader Ahmad al-Shara, though no specific date has been established.
The ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq has also engaged in mediation efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue in Syria. In early January, the party's leader and Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Masrour Barzani, visited Ankara to seek agreements for mediation. A week later, he sent his envoy, Abdul Hamid Darbandi, to Qamishli, facilitating a visit for SDF leader Abdi to Erbil, where he met with Barzani. This meeting brought together Barzani, an ally of Ankara, and Abdi, a fierce opponent.
Sources in Erbil reported that Barzani worked to persuade Abdi to unify the Kurdish stance in Syria through dialogue with the Kurdish National Council, aiming for participation in a political solution without discussing autonomy. Abdi emphasized the need for Barzani to leverage his relations with Turkey to halt military operations, particularly in the Tishrin area, as a preliminary step toward dialogue.
Erbil has expressed willingness to host discussions between northeastern Syria and Damascus; however, the latter seems reluctant as it would imply a form of political equality with the SDF, which it opposes.
Since mid-December 2024, Turkey has been sending military reinforcements to the border opposite areas controlled by the SDF, including armored vehicles and infantry units, indicating potential military operations. Recent weeks have seen increased Turkish air activity, targeting trenches and tunnels in the Manbij countryside, especially near the Tishrin Dam.
Turkey demands the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Syrian territory and the surrender of SDF arms to the Syrian administration. Al-Shara has escalated rhetoric against northeastern Syria, asserting that the Syrian administration will not accept the division of Syria or the existence of groups outside state control. Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra hinted at military options if negotiations fail during a press conference on January 22.
The SDF enjoys full U.S. support, with American forces maintaining several military bases in Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah, and Raqqa. This support has been a significant factor preventing a military resolution from the Syrian administration and its ally Turkey.
Former U.S. envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, outlined the new U.S. administration's stance regarding the SDF. He noted that Washington no longer makes promises to the SDF and that the reasons for U.S. cooperation, primarily the fight against ISIS and preventing Russian advances, have diminished. Jeffrey stated that the U.S. does not support the creation of a separate army within Syria and encourages the SDF to negotiate with the new Syrian administration.
Moreover, it appears the U.S. is working to improve relations with the Syrian administration, particularly concerning counter-terrorism efforts. Reports indicate that the U.S. has engaged in direct information exchanges with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham following the fall of Assad.
This development suggests that the SDF is no longer the sole partner for the U.S. in Syria regarding its primary concern of preventing the resurgence of ISIS. It is likely that Washington is testing the new administration's willingness to collaborate on counter-terrorism before making any decisions regarding the SDF's future.
Overall, the current circumstances indicate that the SDF may struggle to maintain its distinct status from the Syrian state, especially with early signs of the Trump administration's desire to coordinate positions with Turkey, exemplified by the new Secretary of State Marco Rubio's first call regarding the Syrian file with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
Moreover, Erbil, which maintains good relations with Washington, is exerting diplomatic pressure to achieve consensus between the SDF and the Syrian Kurdish National Council before negotiations with Damascus. This could provide the Syrian administration with options for reaching an agreement with other Kurdish factions if the SDF remains obstinate.
Consequently, the SDF may be compelled to make concessions given the declining U.S. position, Turkish military pressures, and ongoing military operations on the ground.